I. INTRODUCTION
The track record of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ("CFPB") is a continuing focal point in national political debates. Critics of the agency have argued that the Bureau lacks accountability and has been too aggressive in its rulemaking, supervisory, and enforcement programs. Defenders of the agency argue that the Bureau's work benefits millions of Americans while preserving access to credit and that the agency is a positive example of government leadership. In the first year of the Trump administration, this national conversation has coalesced around H.R. 10, the proposed Financial Choice Act of 2017 ("Choice Act"), 1 sponsored by House Financial Services Committee Chairman Jeb Hensarling and supported by President Donald J. Trump. The Choice Act substantially amends or repeals many of the reforms adopted in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 2 ("Dodd-Frank Act") after the financial collapse of 2008 and ensuing Great Recession. While the proposed Choice Act addresses a variety of banking and financial industry issues, Title VII of the bill focuses on the CFPB. The proposed legislation would rename the CFPB the "Consumer Law Enforcement Agency" and dramatically curtail the agency's legal authorities in a variety of ways. The Choice Act would, for example: eliminate the CFPB's supervisory authority, 3 repeal the Dodd-Frank Act's prohibition of "unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices" in consumer finance, 4 and eliminate the CFPB's independent source of funding. 5 To inform discussion of the Financial Choice Act in particular and consumer financial policy making more generally, there is an ongoing need for descriptive empirical analysis of the CFPB's law enforcement track record. This article presents an analysis classifying all of the CFPB's publicly announced enforcement actions from the agency's inception through the end of the 2016 calendar year. Moreover, this article also analyzes how the Financial Choice Act would have affected these CFPB enforcement actions if it had been controlling law in recent years. Thus, this study asks a hypothetical question: If the Choice Act were the law of the United States from 2012 to 2016, how would the CFPB's enforcement track record have changed? Answers to this question
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Congress authorized the Bureau "to administer, enforce, and otherwise implement the provisions of Federal consumer financial law." 12 Organizationally, Congress authorized the Bureau to establish a variety of offices and legal authorities within the CFPB. First, the CFPB established a consumer response office to respond to consumer complaints and inquiries regarding financial services businesses. 13 The CFPB's Consumer Response office maintains a web-based and telephone intake portal that handles over some quarter-million inquiries in over 180 languages each year. 14 The Dodd-Frank Act required the creation of several consumer education and empowerment offices within the CFPB. These offices include: a financial education office, 15 an office for providing information, guidance, and technical assistance on providing financial services to traditionally underserved communities, 16 an office focused on the financial protection of older Americans, 17 the office of a private student lending ombudsman, 18 and an office of military service member affairs. 19 The CFPB also has an Office of Regulations which is responsible for exercising the Bureau's rulemaking authority under consumer financial laws. Consumer financial laws are defined to include Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act itself, as well as a list of enumerated consumer financial protection law that include the Truth in Lending Act, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and others. 20 12 12 U.S.C. § 5512(a). 13 See id. at § 5534 (establishing consumer complaint response authorities and responsibilities).
14 FINANCIAL REPORT OF THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU: FISCAL YEAR 2016 , 23 (November 15, 2016 • Working Draft • companies in preparing for exams, and regular Supervisory Highlights reports sharing public results of the examiners' work. 31 Congress also created the CFPB's Office of Fair Lending and Equal Opportunity, which is housed within the Bureau's SEFL division. 32 This office is responsible for providing oversight and enforcement of consumer financial laws that ensure equitable and nondiscriminatory access to credit including in particular the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. 33 The Bureau enforces other consumer financial laws through an Office of Enforcement which investigates and pursues enforcement actions against businesses and individuals governed by consumer financial laws. The Bureau has enforcement jurisdiction over any covered person or service provider to a covered person, except for small banks and credit unions, automobile dealers that do not routinely engage in "buy-here, pay-here" financing, and a short list of other specifically excluded businesses. 34 Congress authorized the Bureau to enforce federal consumer financial laws either through administrative enforcement procedures or through its own authority to litigate in federal court. 35 CFPB administrative enforcement actions are conducted under a CFPB regulation that largely mirrors other administrative enforcement agencies, with trials before an administrative law judge and decisions reviewable on appeal to the Bureau's Director. 36 Congress also authorized the Bureau to bring enforcement actions in Federal court independent of the Department of Justice. 37 In both administrative proceedings and civil litigation, the CFPB is entitled to seek any appropriate legal or equitable relief including restitution, disgorgement, and civil money penalties. 38 The proposed Financial Choice Act of 2017 39 would substantially revise and repeal much of the Dodd-Frank Act. Among many changes, the Choice Act would repeal Dodd-Frank's orderly liquidation authority provisions and eliminate the stress testing and emergency planning requirements for many of the largest financial institutions. With respect to the CFPB, the Choice Act would eliminate or restrict many of the Bureau's powers, offices, and authorities. Initially, the Choice Act appears to embrace and prioritize the CFPB's law enforcement mission by renaming the CFPB the • Working Draft • Consumer Law Enforcement Agency ("CLEA"). 40 The bill would remove the agency's independent source of funding, subjecting it to annual congressional appropriations and potential future budget cuts. 41 The bill would also facilitate changes to sub-units within the CFPB by allowing the director of the new CLEA to dissolve and eliminate the various consumer education and empowerment offices focused on particular vulnerable groups, including the Office of Service Member Affairs, the National Student Lending Ombudsman's office, and the Office of Older Americans. The bill also subjects CFPB employees to the federal government's general compensation schedule which would have the effect of imposing significant pay cuts on existing and future staff 90 days after the Act becomes law. 42 The Choice Act also eliminates the CFPB's research, market monitoring, and publishing authorities. 43 The bill would prohibit the new agency from making consumers' complaint narratives public. 44 And the bill creates a new restriction on using private information about consumers stating that "[t]he Agency may not request, obtain, access, collect, use, retain, or disclose any nonpublic personal information about a consumer" without explicit permission from each consumer. 45 Unlike private companies, the Federal government does not generally enter into contracts with consumers making the logistics of obtaining permission to gather market data potentially insurmountable. Simultaneously, Title VII of the Choice Act provides no restrictions on the ability of banks or other financial service providers to collect and share data about the public.
Ironically, while limiting the Bureau's ability to gather useful market data the Choice Act simultaneously creates a host of new obligations to conduct empirical studies. the legislation would create a new Office of Economic Analysis ("OEA") within the agency tasked with engaging in cost-benefit analysis of public action. 46 The Choice Act would require a cost-benefit analysis, and require the Director to consider that analysis, prior to adopting any rule. 47 The bill would also impose upon the new OEA a constantly revolving docket of periodically scheduled retrospective cost-benefit reviews and public reports on every existing regulation overseen by the agency. 48 Additionally, the bill requires the Director to issue advisory opinions on request. 49 But ironically, the legislation would also instruct courts to ignore these advisory opinions by reversing the current law that requires courts to grant deference to the CFPB's interpretation of the laws and regulations it enforces. 50 • Working Draft • require the expenditure of substantial resources on activities that do not directly benefit victims of illegal practices or provide legal certainty to industry. Moreover, to ensure these ongoing tasks occupy the CLEA's staff time, the legislation also creates a new independent inspector general's office to police the agency. 51 Although the Choice Act appears to prioritize law enforcement, the bill would erect a variety of procedural hurdles in the path of law enforcement investigations, administrative actions, and federal litigation. For example, the Choice Act would give the new OEA a gatekeeping role in all law enforcement matters. Under the new law, the Agency would be required to conduct a specific cost-benefit study prior to initiating any law enforcement case. 52 Moreover, the law appears to require a second, separate cost-benefit analysis before resolving any disputed enforcement action with a consent order. 53 And presumably, the Office of Enforcement within the CLEA would compete for the OEA's cost-benefit analysis resources with the slate of ongoing studies required on all the agency's existing regulations. The bill would also grant defendants in administrative enforcement actions a right to compel the Agency to remove the case to Federal court, thereby limiting the Agency's tactical options. 54 The bill would also slow down investigations by giving civil investigative demand respondents the right to respond more slowly and to challenge the Agency's right to collect information in Federal court. 55 The Choice Act also eliminates the common pool of civil money penalty funds that provides consumer relief to victims of insolvent defendants. 56 Currently, this pool provides thousands of victimized families compensation when the businesses or individuals that hurt them are bankrupt or have hidden their assets. Under the Choice Act, any excess civil money penalties would simply be handed over to Congress while families victimized by insolvent defendants would receive no compensation. 57 The Choice Act would also eliminate the CFPB's supervisory authority. 58 Under the Choice Act, the new CLEA would no longer conduct compliance audits of large banks, mortgage brokers, credit reporting agencies, debt collectors, and other businesses currently subject to CFPB supervision. The CFPB schedules its exams by analyzing which businesses present the greatest risk of violating federal consumer protection laws and causing harm to consumers. 59 Examiners are tasked with helping the industry achieve consistent compliance standards for federal consumer financial laws nationwide. 60 • Working Draft • that houses several hundred compliance examiners that travel the country conducting compliance audits of supervised businesses. 61 Supervision is one of the key methods through which the CFPB monitors and responds to spikes and trends in industry problems. 62 Eliminating this supervisory oversight would take away the CFPB's primary method of resolving compliance problems outside of a public, adversarial enforcement action context. Under the Choice Act, the new CLEA would not have access to consumer finance business records unless it was prepared to sue to obtain those records in Federal court. Instead, the Choice Act would return supervisory authority for consumer protection to the banking regulations responsible for supervision prior to the 2008 financial crisis. And for non-bank companies such as debt collectors, credit reporting agencies, and payday lenders, federal compliance exams would simply cease to exist. Thus, while the legislation creates higher hurdles for bringing enforcement cases, it also eliminates the agency's most powerful non-adversarial tool for gathering compliance information necessary to surmount those hurdles.
Substantively, the Choice Act also changes several consumer protection laws. The most far reaching change is the repeal of the Dodd-Frank Act's prohibition of "unfair, deceptive and abusive acts or practices." 63 The CFPB's law enforcement program has focused more on deterring deception by consumer finance businesses than any other regulatory requirement. 64 In the first five years of the CFPB's enforcement program, " [d] eception was, by far, the most commonly pleaded claim in CFPB matters." 65 Cases that included a deception claim produced over 90 percent of the consumer relief provided to the American public. 66 Without the Dodd-Frank Act's prohibition of unfair, deceptive and abusive practices, the new CLEA would not have a law within its jurisdiction that would allow it to challenge even intentional lying by banks or other financial service providers to their customers. As they did before the fiscal crisis, prudential banking regulators would continue to have enforcement authority for unfair and deceptive practices, 67 but-bizarrely-the new agency specifically tasked with consumer law enforcement would not. 68 The Choice Act would also eliminate the CFPB's regulatory and enforcement authority over what is arguably the most controversial segment of the consumer finance industry: short-term, high-interest lending. Specifically, the Choice Act would prohibit 70 Others view payday loans are a necessary tool for liquidity constrained consumers and believe prohibition of the product would lead to unintended consequences. 71 The public overwhelmingly supports usury limits that effectively ban the product. 72 The DoddFrank Act does not allow the CFPB to eliminate payday lending with an interest rate limit, but it does prohibit payday lenders from using unfair, deceptive or abusive marketing, underwriting, or collection tactics. 73 While the Federal Trade Commission would continue to have jurisdiction over non-bank lenders, under the proposed Choice Act the new Consumer Law Enforcement Agency would not have the authority to bring an enforcement action against a payday lender that intentionally lies about its products or services. The new CLEA would also be powerless to enforce enumerated federal consumer protection laws including the Truth in Lending Act, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, and the Fair Credit Reporting Act against payday lenders. Under the Choice Act payday lenders would receive the most favorable, lightly regulated treatment of any consumer financial service provider in America. Collectively, the constraints placed on the CFPB by the proposed Financial Choice Act of 2017 would severely restrain actual law enforcement at the new consumer law enforcement agency.
III. METHODS
This study identifies and classifies every public CFPB enforcement case from the inception of the CFPB through the end of the 2016 calendar year. Public CFPB enforcement actions were identified through the CFPB's website, press releases, annual reports to Congress, administrative adjudication docket, and searches of the Bureau's unsealed federal court pleadings. For each case, the CFPB has released some legal
• Working Draft • documentation of the enforcement matter. Typically, these documents include one or more of the following: a notice of charges, a complaint, a consent order, a stipulation consenting to issuance of a consent order, or a settlement agreement. For cases pursued through the CFPB's administrative enforcement procedures, the Bureau's Office of Administrative Adjudication ("OAA") maintains a docket sheet that includes all publicly available pleadings, motions, and orders. For cases in litigation, court filings were accessed as necessary through the publicly available PACER system provided by the U.S. judiciary.
For each of the CFPB's public enforcement matters, these documents were reviewed and coded using over 70 different variables. The data set analyzed in this study updates and expands upon a data set compiled for a previous study reported in the Tulane Law Review. 74 Coded variables included: the date the Bureau announced each case; the date the case was resolved (if any); whether the case was filed as an administrative enforcement matter or in U.S. district court; whether the case was settled or contested upon announcement; whether the case involved a bank, credit union, or some other non-depository company; whether the Bureau charged an individual defendant with violating the law; and dollar amounts of total consumer redress and civil money penalties awarded in all consent orders, final administrative orders, or judgments imposed in every concluded matter. 75 This study also classifies every violation of law the CFPB has asserted in public enforcement actions based on the statute providing the legal authority for the claim. These classifications include all 18 enumerated statutes set out in the Dodd-Frank Act, additional law that Congress subsequently added to the Bureau's enforcement jurisdiction, as well as the Bureau's unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts or practices ("UDAAP") authorities. This study also classified the financial product or service involved in each case based on the following categories: credit cards, mortgage loans, student loans, automobile purchase loans, nonauto retail finance, deposit accounts, remittances, pawn credit, payday loans (including similar small installment loans and car title lending), medical debt, and payment processing services.
Furthermore, this study adds a new dimension to the debate of the Choice Act by empirically testing a thought experiment: if the Choice Act had been controlling law from 2012 to 2016, how would the CFPB's law enforcement cases have changed? While the Choice Act includes broad structural, procedural and substantive changes to the CFPB and the laws it enforces, this thought experiment is limited to two substantive legal changes: (1) the elimination of the Dodd-Frank Act's prohibition of unfair, deceptive and abusive acts or practices and (2) the broad exemption for payday loans, car title loans, and other similar forms of small dollar lending.
IV. RESULTS
This Part presents two categories of results: (1) Table 1 provides further context by listing the monetary value in consumer relief and civil money penalties of public CFPB enforcement actions by year. These values are further classified by whether the consumer relief and civil money penalties were imposed upon banks, credit unions, or non-depository business. In 2016 the CFPB imposed nearly $196 million in civil money penalties, an amount comparable to the $205 million imposed in 2015. However, total consumer relief declined significantly from $6.5 billion in 2015 to $292 million in 2016. Calendar year 2016 did see the first CFPB public enforcement action against a credit union. The CFPB signed a consent order with Navy Federal Credit Union providing $23 million in consumer relief and a $5.5 million civil money penalty for misleading customers about its debt collection practices and unlawfully restricting consumers' access to their own funds. 76 Credit Unions, only less than a half dozen of which meet the $10 billion asset threshold for CFPB jurisdiction, have only paid about two-tenths of one percent of all consumer relief. In comparison, through 2016 the CFPB has generated approximately $7.4 billion in consumer relief from banks and about $4 billion in consumer relief from nondepository consumer financial services companies. 76 In re Navy Fed. Credit Union, CFPB No. 2016 -CFPB-0024 (Oct. 11, 2016 , http:// files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/102016_cfpb_NavyFederalConsentOrder.p df. Table 2 shows trends in the settlement of CFPB cases alongside the CFPB's decision to charge an individual defendant in each enforcement action. With respect to the former, in 17 out of 42 enforcement actions announced in 2016, at least one defendant had not reached a settlement agreement with the Bureau. With about 40 percent of cases contested, 2016 saw a significant uptick in the proportion of cases where the CFPB had not concluded a settlement agreement at the time it announced each action. Nevertheless, nine of the 17 contested cases were relatively minor disputes that the CFPB brought as part of two "sweeps." The first was a sweep of car title lenders in Arizona that were violating the Truth in Lending Act's restriction on advertising interest rates in a format other than an annual percentage rate. 77 All of the cases were settled shortly after announcement with consent to a relatively modest civil money penalty. The second sweep focused on several pawnshops in Virginia that were 77 15 U.S.C. § 1664(c); Press Release, CFPB, CFPB Sues Five Arizona Title Lenders for Failing to Disclose Loan Annual Percentage Rate to Consumers (September 21, 2016), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/aboutus/newsroom/cfpb-sues-five-arizona-title-lenders-failing-disclose-loan-annualpercentage-rate-consumers/.
• Working Draft • providing consumers with inaccurate TILA price disclosures. 78 Like the Arizona sweep, each case resolved quickly with a civil money penalty. Placing these matters to the side, the eight remaining contested cases reflect a level of settlement comparable to prior years.
The rate at which the CFPB charged at least one individual person in public enforcement actions declined slightly in 2016. In prior years, the CFPB included charges against at least one individual person in between 25 and 37 percent of cases. In 2016, 9 out of 42 enforcement cases included charges against an individual person reflecting a rate of about 21 percent. Whether the Bureau charges individuals in public enforcement actions is important, because a key lesson of the financial crisis was the importance of holding individual employees accountable for corporate wrongdoing. 79 On the other hand, charging individual defendants decreases the likelihood of achieving a settlement and increases the resources the Bureau must dedicate to each matter. Overall the Bureau has charged an individual defendant in 28 percent of its public enforcement cases. In the years following passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, the legal theory that generated the most discussion and controversy was the prohibition of "abusive" practices, an addition to the longer-standing restrictions on deceptive and unfair conduct. Some have expressed concern that a general prohibition of abusive practices would allow the CFPB to use an 'I know it when I see it' approach to enforcement that
• Working Draft • could lead to abuse of government power. 80 Table 3 provides an interesting contrast between CFPB cases that included deceptive practices claims and cases that included abusive practices claims. In every year of the CFPB's existence the number and size of cases attacking false or misleading claims far outstrips those cases challenging abusive practices. Reflecting trends of previous years, in 2016 a majority of all CFPB cases (23 out of 42) included at least one claim challenging false or misleading material statements made by a bank, credit union, or financial service provider. Moreover, the largest CFPB cases as measured by relief provided to American consumers have overwhelmingly included claims attacking deceptive practices. In the history of the CFPB, over 93 percent of all consumer relief was awarded in cases where the business deceived its customers about a material fact. In contrast, the CFPB has accused businesses of engaging in abusive practices relatively infrequently and only in relatively small cases. Overall, consumer relief in cases alleging abusive practices constituted only around 1 percent of all consumer relief awarded in CFPB enforcement actions. Indeed, these data suggest that above all else, the CFPB's enforcement program has focused on promoting truthfulness in consumer finance. LAW360 (Feb. 12, 2015, 5:41 PM) , http://www.law360.com/articles/621386/is-thecfpb-torturing-language-with-its-abusive-standard-?article_related_content=1 ("This 'I know it when I see it' approach naturally grants the CFPB the maximum flexibility to bring enforcement actions, while granting industry participants the minimum level of notice about what is required of them.").
• Working Draft • of each case. Section 733 would eliminate regulatory and enforcement jurisdiction over payday loans, car title loans, and other similar forms of small dollar credit. 81 Section 734 would repeal the Dodd-Frank Act's prohibition of deceptive, unfair, and abusive consumer finance. 82 Looking back at CFPB enforcement actions, those cases that only pleaded UDAAP claims would not have been possible if section 734 of the Choice Act were in effect. Similarly, every CFPB case involving payday or automobile title lending would have been untenable if section 733 were controlling law. The effect of these two changes is tallied for a selected list of product or service types in Table 4 . Notably, 13 of the CFPB's 52 mortgage cases only included UDAAP charges and therefore would have been eliminated. Forty-one percent of debt collection cases would have been eliminated and 63 percent of credit card cases would have been impossible. And of course, all 24 of the CFPB's payday lending related cases would have been unviable if section 733 of the Choice Act had been controlling law at the time of each case. Indeed, a large proportion of the CFPB's cases in virtually every type of financial product or service would have been impossible if the Choice Act had been in effect from 2012 to 2016.
Nevertheless, focusing on eliminated cases actually understates the effect the Choice Act would have had upon the CFPB's track record. In addition to eliminated cases, the right-hand columns in table 4 adds those cases that would have been seriously weakened by the Choice Act for one or more of three reasons. First the right-hand columns include those cases where at least one UDAAP claim would have been eliminated under section 733 but one or more claims under an enumerated statute would have remained. Many CFPB cases include both UDAAP claims as well as one or more causes of action arising out of an enumerated statute such as the Truth in Lending Act or the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. However, violations that sound in UDAAP law are often more serious and associated with more consumer harm than what are sometimes technical violations of enumerated statutes. The elimination of UDAAP jurisdiction would seriously weaken these enforcement actions. Second, the right-hand columns include cases some courts might have considered to be beyond CFPB jurisdiction because they involved a form of small dollar credit similar to payday loans. While section 733 of the Choice Act provides an exemption to "payday loans, vehicle title loans, or other similar loans," the Act does not provide guidance on what types of credit are "similar" to payday loans. Arguably, defendants in pawn shop cases and some forms of installment lending cases could claim they too qualify for the Choice Act's small dollar lending exemption. These cases would have been severely weakened by the Choice Act because the CFPBs jurisdiction to would have been unclear. And third, the right-hand columns also add cases that included Equal Credit Opportunity Act claims, which would have been undermined by repeal of the CFPB's guidance on racial discrimination in automobile finance in section 735 of the Choice Act. 83 With an explicit rebuke from Congress, the authority of the CFPB to challenge auto finance company kick-backs to car dealers in exchange for delivering above par interest rate loans to Black and Latino borrowers would have been much less certain.
With • Working Draft • Choice Act would have been to eliminate or severely weaken almost every CFPB enforcement case. If the Choice Act had been in effect, every single CFPB enforcement action involving credit cards, payday loans, ancillary "add-on" products, debt relief services, automobile financing, student loans, payment processing, checking or savings accounts, and pawnshops would have either been eliminated or substantially weakened. The Choice Act would also have eliminated or seriously weakened 38 out of 39 debt collection cases and four out of five retail finance cases. , 2012-2016. Placing to the side those cases that the Choice Act merely would have weakened, the Choice Act would have entirely eliminated those CFPB cases that provided the vast majority of actual relief to American consumers. Table 5 tallies the consumer restitution, forgiven debts, and other direct consumer relief provided to the American public in CFPB cases that either exclusively pleaded UDAAP claims or involved payday lending. While the Choice Act would not have explicitly prohibited 75 percent of the CFPB's mortgage lending cases, the 25 percent of those cases that would have been eliminated generated 91.5 percent of the relief provided to consumers. Similarly, the 41% of debt collection cases eliminated by the Choice Act accounted for 87% of the relief provided to the public. Furthermore, the seventeen eliminated credit card cases were responsible for providing $6.7 billion in relief to consumers, accounting for 94 percent of the compensation to the public for illegal practices associated with that type of product. Across every type of financial service, the Choice Act's elimination of UDAAP claims-especially those claims attacking deceptive practices-would have
• Working Draft • protected those consumer finance businesses that the CFPB found to have caused the most harm to the largest number of Americans. Similarly, Table 6 shows the effect the proposed elimination of UDAAP authority and payday lending jurisdiction would have had on civil money penalties imposed by the CFPB from 2012 to 2016. Similar to the effect of the Choice Act upon consumer relief, had the proposed legislation been in effect, it would have vastly reduced the fines the CFPB imposed on companies that engaged in unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices. For example, those cases accounting for nearly 95 percent of the civil money penalties imposed by the CFPB relating to credit cards would have been eliminated. Moreover, the Choice Act would have wiped out all of the fines related to payment processing and deposit accounts. Most notably, in 2016 the CFPB imposed a $100 million fine on Wells Fargo for fraudulently creating over two million fake, unauthorized bank accounts in the names of its customers. The CFPB challenged this practice using the UDAAP authority that the Choice Act proposes to eliminate.
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